Spartanburg Divorce Lawyer & Attorney : Stevens-MacPhail Law Firm : South Carolina Family Law Serving Columbia, Charleston, Greenville, Hilton Head Island

The South Carolina Supreme Court recently decided a case that addressed the importance of obtaining voluntary parent consent in adoption cases.  This case also included a thorough discussion of the relinquishment law in our state, particularly when compared with that of surrounding states.

In McCann v. Doe, the Court held that abundant evidence existed to support the Family Court's determination that the biological mother's consent to relinquish her parental rights was involuntary.  The Family Court ordered that the child be returned to the biologial mother, and the Supreme Court found that was also proper. 

While both the adoptive and biological parents presented evidence that they were fit parents, it was in the child's best interest to be raised by its biological parent and for custody to be returned to her.  You can read the full text of McCann v. Doe by clicking HERE.

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The South Carolina Supreme Court issued a decision earlier this week that is important for those involved with or interested in adoptions, particularly as to the issue of notice.  In this interstate adoption case, appellants John and Jane Doe directly appealed from two South Carolina Family Court Orders, both of which the Court reversed and remanded.  The first Order had dismissed appellants’ adoption action based on jurisdictional grounds, and the second Order had enforced an Illinois decree, which ordered the return of the baby girl to respondent Birthmother in Illinois.

Among its holdings, the Court stated that although the Does received indirect notice of the Illinois hearing and retained an attorney to enter a special appearance, they were never officially served notice of the hearing and were not provided with copies of the pleadings; where there is not even an attempt at service of process, the notice requirements of the federal Parental Kidnapping Prevention Act are not met, and actual notice is insufficient to confer personal jurisdiction. As to the second order, the Illinois decree was flawed and not entitled to full faith and credit in a South Carolina court because the Does were not named as parties to the Illinois actions and were not given proper notice and an opportunity to be heard.

You can read the full text of John Doe v. Baby Girl, Opinion No. 26425, by clicking HERE.

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